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RESPECTING THE RIGHT TO RESEARCH:  
PROXY CONSENT AND SUBJECT ASSENT IN 
ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE CLINICAL TRIALS 
Mikaela L. J. Louie* 
Abstract: Alzheimer’s Disease is the sixth-leading cause of death in the United States and 
the only disease in the top ten causes of death with no prevention, treatment, or cure. To find 
any meaningful treatment or cure, researchers must conduct clinical trials on subjects with 
Alzheimer’s Disease. Subjects with Alzheimer’s Disease, however, generally lack legal 
capacity to consent to research due to diminished cognition. While informed consent 
standards for individuals who lack capacity are well settled in the medical treatment context, 
such standards are much less clear in the research context. A patchwork of legal and 
regulatory guidance addresses this issue, but no uniform framework exists.  
In January 2017, the federal government responded to the problem of unclear proxy 
consent standards by updating the Common Rule, which regulates human subjects research. 
Attempting to clarify prior vagueness, the regulation extended existing laws and policies on 
proxy consent in clinical treatment to the research context. While this was a welcome change, 
state laws and institutional policies remain inconsistent. Therefore, states should 
affirmatively enact legislation to ensure inclusion for all participants in medical research. 
Practically, this may be as simple as amending existing health care surrogate decision-
making statutes—allowing proxy consent and substituted judgment in the research context 
explicitly. Additionally, federal regulators, Institutional Review Boards, and researchers 
should consider establishing an assent and dissent standard for research subjects who lack 
capacity, specifically in Alzheimer’s Disease clinical trials. 
 
So how could I be mad? She was setting the example, as she had done  
her whole life, her whole career, without pessimism or regret, or fanfare,  
just ready to go on, even though her words and steps might mutate,  
unpredictably, ever aware of the possible endpoints, with each of us  
now grappling this present moment, trying to recognize its identity. 
—Ron Louie, M.D., Clinical Professor, 
University of Washington1 
                                                     
* J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2019. This Comment is 
dedicated to IRJ and RRL. Thank you to Terry Price and the Washington Law Review editorial staff 
for their support and feedback. I serve as a volunteer member of the Board of Directors for 
Alzheimer’s Association, Washington State and Northern Idaho Chapter. All opinions and 
omissions are my own. 
1. Ron Louie, Matter of Fact, 90 NEUROLOGY 139 (2018) (medical poem recounting early onset 
AD diagnosis experience). 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2011, Congress passed the National Alzheimer’s Project Act 
(NAPA) to address a growing public health and economic crisis.2 An 
estimated 5.5 million individuals in the United States are currently living 
with Alzheimer’s Disease (AD).3 AD is the only disease in the nation’s 
top ten causes of death that cannot be prevented, treated, or cured.4 The 
disease kills more people than breast cancer and prostate cancer 
combined.5 Beyond the physical and emotional toll, AD is tremendously 
expensive.6 In 2017 alone, AD cost the United States $259 billion.7 
Considering these challenges, NAPA set out lofty goals, aspiring to treat 
and prevent AD by 2025.8 With the NAPA target date rapidly 
approaching and the list of research failures growing daily,9 
policymakers, government agencies, and researchers must implement 
changes in AD research. 
Physicians are trained to treat illness and, with the advancement of 
modern medicine, are increasingly expected to cure disease.10 
Individuals living with AD, however, cannot rely on the expectation of 
treatment or cure.11 Other major diseases like cancer and HIV-AIDS 
held the same dire status of incurable disease years ago but have since 
                                                     
2. National Alzheimer’s Project Act, Pub. L. No. 111-375, 124 Stat. 4100 (2011) (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 11225 (2018)). The statute designates the Secretary of Health and Human Services as the 
implementer of an integrated national plan and coordinator of Alzheimer’s research and services 
across all Federal agencies. 42 U.S.C. § 11225; see also id. § 11201 (providing statistics illustrating 
Congress’s findings). 
3. Alzheimer’s Ass’n, 2017 Alzheimer’s Disease Facts and Figures, 13 ALZHEIMER’S & 
DEMENTIA 325, 334 (2017) (discussing how the estimated number of people with Alzheimer’s 
dementia comes from the latest 2010 U.S. Census data and the Chicago Health and Aging Project 
(CHAP), though noting that “Alzheimer’s dementia is underdiagnosed and underreported”). 
4. Id. at 340. 
5. Id. at 325. 
6. See id. at 325, 340; David H. Freedman, The Missing Alzheimer’s Pill, POLITICO (Dec. 13, 
2017, 5:19 AM), https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2017/12/13/drug-industry-new-
developments-000598 [https://perma.cc/65MY-MHY5]. 
7. Alzheimer’s Ass’n, supra note 3, at 350 (Medicare: $131 billion; Medicaid: $44 billion; out of 
pocket: $56 billion; and other: $28 billion). 
8. National Alzheimer’s Project Act, Pub. L. No. 111-375, § 2(e), 124 Stat. 4100, 4101–03 (2011) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 11225 (2018)).  
9. Damian Garde, Pharma’s Latest Alzheimer’s Failure Comes with a Particular Sting, STAT 
(Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.statnews.com/2018/02/13/pharmas-alzheimers-failure-merck/ 
[https://perma.cc/9KFQ-HQ6E].  
10. See David Epstein & Propublica, When Evidence Says No, but Doctors Say Yes, ATLANTIC 
(Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2017/02/when-evidence-says-no-but-
doctors-say-yes/517368/ [https://perma.cc/Q4ZJ-79HL]. 
11. Alzheimer’s Ass’n, supra note 3, at 340.  
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enjoyed remarkable progress.12 Yet, AD has seen little progress despite 
decades of research attempts,13 rising public awareness, increased 
funds,14 and other regulatory changes.15 
AD is an “irreversible, progressive brain disorder that slowly destroys 
memory and thinking skills and, eventually, the ability to carry out the 
simplest tasks.”16 AD is a specific disease that falls under the broader 
category of dementia; it is the most common cause of dementia among 
older adults.17 Dementia is the “loss of cognitive functioning—thinking, 
remembering, and reasoning—and behavioral abilities to such an extent 
that it interferes with a person’s daily life and activities.”18 Dementia 
“ranges in severity from the mildest stage, when it is just beginning to 
affect a person’s functioning, to the most severe stage, when the person 
must depend completely on others for basic activities of living.”19 
The AD cognitive decline ultimately renders an individual legally 
incapacitated. In the eyes of the law, an individual with later stage AD 
lacks the capacity to make decisions or provide informed consent.20 
                                                     
12. Steven G. Deeks et al., The End of AIDS: HIV Infection As a Chronic Disease, 382 LANCET 
1525–33 (2013) (discussing “[t]he success of antiretrovial therapy,” and how “[t]he idea of HIV as a 
chronic disease has emerged as a result of advances in treatment in the past three decades”); 
Rebecca L. Siegel, Kimberly D. Miller & Ahmedin Jemal, Cancer Statistics, 2018, 68 CA: CANCER 
J. FOR CLINICIANS 7 (2018) (“The combined cancer death rate dropped continuously from 1991 to 
2015 by a total of 26%, translating to approximately 2,378,600 fewer cancer deaths than would have 
been expected if death rates had remained at their peak.”). 
13. Maria Burke, Why Alzheimer’s Drugs Keep Failing, SCIENTIFIC AM. (July 14, 2014) 
(originally published in CHEMISTRY WORLD (July 3, 2014)), 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/why-alzheimer-s-drugs-keep-failing/ 
[https://perma.cc/8H7Z-ZDAX]; John Carroll, Merck’s Leading Ph111 BACE Drug Implodes in 
Latest Alzheimer’s Disaster, ENDPOINTS NEWS (Feb. 15, 2017, 11:13 AM), 
https://endpts.com/mercks-leading-phiii-bace-drug-implodes-in-latest-alzheimers-disaster/ 
[https://perma.cc/ML9P-M36C]; Freedman, supra note 6; Melissa Healy, One of the Most 
Promising Drugs for Alzheimer’s Disease Fails in Clinical Trials, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2018, 3:55 
PM), https://www.latimes.com/science/sciencenow/la-sci-sn-alzheimers-drug-fail-20180109-
story.html [https://perma.cc/RX5D-RWML] (“Idalopirdine, an experimental drug that seemed one 
of the most promising candidates to treat Alzheimer’s disease, failed several phase 3 clinical 
trials.”). 
14. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, Pub. L. 115-31, 131 Stat. 135 (increasing 
National Institute on Aging AD research funding by $400 million).  
15. See Early Alzheimer’s Disease: Developing Drugs and Treatment: Draft Guidance for 
Industry, 83 Fed. Reg. 7060 (Feb. 16, 2018) (proposing accelerated approval by considering 
biomarker data and cognitive evaluations). 
16. What Is Alzheimer’s Disease?, NAT’L. INST. ON AGING, (Dec. 31, 2017), 
https://www.nia.nih.gov/health/what-alzheimers-disease [https://perma.cc/D5WD-Z33D]. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. See In re Denison’s Estate, 23 Wash. 2d 699, 706, 716–19, 162 P.2d 245, 248, 253–54 (1945). 
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States have responded to this phenomenon by enacting legislation 
establishing elaborate schemes of surrogate decision making.21 Twenty-
six states have enacted the Uniform Power of Attorney Act22 to create 
default rules in case of future incapacity.23 Fewer than a dozen states, 
however, specifically address proxy consent in the research context.24 At 
the federal level, regulations on human subjects research, known as the 
“Common Rule,” remained vague on proxy consent for years.25 Despite 
a Common Rule update in 2017 attempting to clarify prior vagueness, 
the change does little beyond leaving it to the states and “institutional 
policy” (e.g., Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)).26 Ultimately, 
confusion will persist because state laws vary widely on surrogate 
decision-making standards,27 and IRBs are inconsistent in their proxy 
consent practices.28 
This Comment examines the current legal and regulatory frameworks 
addressing consent for individuals who lack capacity in the biomedical 
research context and argues for a uniform approach. Part I examines the 
doctrine of informed consent, legal standards for surrogate decision 
making, and the development of these standards in the medical treatment 
context. Part II explores how the informed consent doctrine manifests in 
the biomedical research context, specifically in inconsistent regulatory 
frameworks and state statutes. Part II also outlines possible 
                                                     
21. See ABA COMM’N ON LAW & AGING, DEFAULT SURROGATE CONSENT STATUTES (2018), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/law_aging/2014_default_surrogate_c
onsent_statutes.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/3CQN-CUA5].  
22. UNIF. POWER OF ATT’Y ACT (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 
2006), https://comm.ncsl.org/productfiles/83335813/UPOAA_2011_FinalAct_2014sep9.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F5MN-MXY5]. 
23. Power of Attorney Act, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, https://my.uniformlaws.org/committees/ 
community-home?CommunityKey=b1975254-8370-4a7c-947f-e5af0d6cb07c (last visited Apr. 30, 
2019). 
24. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24178 (West 2019); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/3.1(b) 
(2019); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4974 (2019); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 431.064, 630.115 (2019); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 26:14-5 (West 2019); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3102A (West 2019). 
25. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. 7,149, 7,170–71 (Jan. 19, 
2017) (codified in scattered parts of 6, 7, 10, 14, 15, 20, 22, 24, 29, 32, 34, 38, 40, 45, 49 C.F.R.). 
26. Id. at 7,170–71, 7,260. 
27. ABA COMM’N ON LAW & AGING, supra note 21. 
28. Michelle Ng Gong et al., Surrogate Consent for Research Involving Adults with Impaired 
Decision Making: Survey of Institutional Review Board Practices, 38 CRITICAL CARE MED. 2146, 
2146 (2010) (discussing how 6% of IRBs “do not accept surrogate consent for research from any 
persons, and 22% of [IRBs] accept only an authorized proxy, spouse, or parent as surrogates, 
excluding adult children and other family. [IRBs] vary in their limits on research risks in studies 
involving incapacitated adults: 15% disallow any research regardless of risk in studies without 
direct benefit, whereas 39% allow only minimal risk.”). 
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modifications to informed consent for subjects with AD, including 
assent and dissent standards as used for minors participating in clinical 
research. Part III describes the state of AD research and how researchers 
seek consent from subjects with AD. Finally, Part IV argues for the 
adoption of proxy consent in medical research statutes and other 
informed consent modifications to ensure effective, efficient, and 
respectful participation in later-stage AD clinical trials. 
I. INFORMED CONSENT AND SURROGATE DECISION 
MAKING IN MEDICAL TREATMENT 
While the concept of informed consent is rooted in medical ethics, it 
is inherently a legal construct.29 This Part first examines the 
development of informed consent in common law. It then explores two 
primary legal standards for surrogate decision making: substituted 
judgment and best interests. Finally, it discusses how Cruzan v. 
Director, Missouri Department of Health,30 an instrumental 
U.S. Supreme Court case, led to the utilization of advance directives and 
Durable Power of Attorney statutes.31 
A. The Evolution of Informed Consent in Common Law 
The legal doctrine of informed consent is grounded in principles of 
patient autonomy and individual rights.32 Traditionally, patients followed 
“doctor’s orders” without question.33 A change in these “traditional 
patterns of communication between doctors and patients came not from 
medicine but from law.”34 In 1914, then-judge Benjamin N. Cardozo 
articulated the informed consent proposition in the treatment context: 
Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to 
determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon 
                                                     
29. Jay Katz, Informed Consent — Must It Remain a Fairy Tale?, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & 
POL’Y 69, 77 (1994). 
30. 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
31. See In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 178 (Fla. 2001) (citing to a Florida statute 
stating “[w]hen a living will or other advance directive does not exist, it stands to reason that the 
surrogate decision-maker will be a person who is close to the patient and thereby likely to inherit 
from the patient”); Charity Scott, Why Law Pervades Medicine: An Essay on Ethics in Health Care, 
14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 245, 268–69 (2000); Tamar Lewin, Nancy Cruzan 
Dies, Outlived by a Debate Over the Right to Die, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1990, at A15. 
32. See Cathy J. Jones, Autonomy and Informed Consent in Medical Decisionmaking: Toward a 
New Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 379, 385 (1990). 
33. Katz, supra note 29, at 74. 
34. Id. at 77.  
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who performs an operation without his patient’s consent 
commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages. This is 
true, except in cases of emergency where the patient is 
unconscious, and where it is necessary to operate before consent 
can be obtained.35 
Informed consent jurisprudence evolved from this early concept. In 
1957, a California court coined the term “informed consent,” holding 
that “a physician violates his duty to his patient and subjects himself to 
liability if he withholds any facts which are necessary to form the basis 
of an intelligent consent by [the] patient to [the] proposed treatment.”36 
In Canterbury v. Spence,37 a young man sought medical treatment for 
back pain.38 The patient’s physician determined that a simple procedure 
was necessary to treat the pain.39 During the operation, the physician 
realized that the patient had a more serious spinal issue and performed a 
more invasive surgery.40 During recovery, the patient—not knowing that 
the doctor had performed a more invasive surgery—fell out of his 
hospital bed and became partially paralyzed.41 In this seminal case, the 
D.C. Circuit held that informed consent is based on the patient’s 
perspective, not the medical community’s standard of reasonableness.42 
In other words, the scope of informed consent must be “measured by the 
patient’s need,” which critically encompasses “information material to 
the decision” of accepting any given treatment.43 The court noted that 
“[t]he average patient has little or no understanding of the medical arts, 
and ordinarily has only his physician to whom he can look for 
enlightenment with which to reach an intelligent decision.”44 
B. Informed Consent for Individuals Who Lack Capacity 
Cardozo’s principle of informed consent applied to adults of “sound 
mind.”45 Due to the significance of autonomy, “it is well-settled that the 
                                                     
35. Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (emphasis added) (citation 
omitted). 
36. Salgo v. Leland Stanford Junior Univ. Bd. of Trs., 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957). 
37. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
38. See id. at 776. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 777. 
41. Id. at 777–78. 
42. Id. at 783–86. 
43. Id. at 786. 
44. Id. at 780. 
45. Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).  
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law presumes adult persons are . . . capable, rather than incapable, to 
direct their personal affairs until satisfactory evidence to the contrary is 
presented.”46 A variety of factors determine a person’s ability to be 
autonomous.47 When an individual no longer possesses those abilities, 
they are judged legally incapacitated.48 As one court describes: 
Incapacity is the legal status that occurs when a person’s 
autonomy becomes either partially or totally impaired. A person 
lacks the ability to be autonomous—to exercise free will—when 
he or she lacks the ability to absorb information, to understand 
its implications, to correctly perceive the environment, or to 
understand the relationship between his or her desires or actions. 
A person is likewise incapacitated when he or she cannot control 
his or her actions or behavior.49 
Thus, legal incapacity may occur as a result of any number of medical 
conditions. In addition to AD, courts may consider individuals with 
other conditions (e.g., severe mental illness, schizophrenia, traumatic 
brain injury, brain dead, terminally ill) legally incapacitated.50 
Informed consent for incapacitated patients caught the nation’s 
attention with a series of cases involving women in persistent vegetative 
states (PVS).51 In one landmark case, Nancy Cruzan laid in a PVS after a 
terrible car accident.52 When Cruzan’s parents attempted to terminate 
life-support, state hospital officials refused based on state policy.53 The 
Supreme Court of Missouri ruled in favor of the state policy over the 
                                                     
46. In re Conservatorship of Groves, 109 S.W.3d 317, 329–30 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). 
47. Id. at 328–30.  
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 328–29. 
50. See Sameer S. Apte, Blood Substitutes-The Polyheme Trials, 11 MCGILL J. MED. 59, 61 
(2008) (treating unconscious patients as legally incapacitated in emergent situations, when 
“obtaining informed consent from a legally authorized representative [is] infeasible given the time 
frame in which the subject must be treated”); Debra L. Dippel, Someone to Watch Over Me: 
Medical Decision-Making for Hopelessly Ill Incompetent Adult Patients, 24 AKRON L. REV. 639, 
640 (1991).  
51. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 262 n.1, 266 (1990) (discussing 
how Cruzan, who sustained serious injuries from an automobile accident, “now lies in a Missouri 
state hospital in what is commonly referred to as a persistent vegetative state”); In re Guardianship 
of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 177 (Fla. 2001) (“Theresa [Schiavo], age 27, suffered a cardiac arrest as 
a result of a potassium imbalance. . . . The evidence is overwhelming that Theresa is in a permanent 
or persistent vegetative state.”); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 651 (N.J. 1976) (“At the age of 22, 
[Quinlan] lies in a debilitated and allegedly moribund state . . . .”). 
52. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 266–68. 
53. Id. at 267–68.  
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family’s right to refuse treatment.54 Ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court 
found that while “the common-law doctrine of informed consent is 
viewed as generally encompassing the right of a competent individual to 
refuse medical treatment,”55 this right did not extend to incompetent 
persons absent “clear and convincing” evidence that the patient—in this 
case, Cruzan—personally desired to withdraw treatment.56 On remand, 
the family ultimately proffered enough evidence of Cruzan’s preferences 
to withdraw life-sustaining treatment.57 
Nevertheless, state and federal law recognizes an incompetent 
individual’s right to autonomy and self-determination.58 If a patient is 
deemed legally incapacitated to consent, there are several options for 
third party decision makers. 
1. Surrogate Decision-Making Standards 
All fifty states have enacted surrogate health care decision-making 
statutes.59 Each state law, however, varies with respect to: (1) limitations 
on surrogate decision making; (2) the appropriate legal standard; and 
(3) provisions addressing patients with no available qualified surrogate.60 
Prior to state statutory enactments, courts approved surrogate consent.61 
Whether executed as a Durable Power of Attorney (DPOA) for health 
care or by state statute, regulation and law generally refers to a surrogate 
decision maker as a “legally authorized representative” (LAR) in the 
research context.62 
Generally, surrogate decision-making statutes authorize a list of 
surrogates in lieu of a patient-designated person.63 Many states list 
default surrogates in order by familial relationship.64 For example, 
                                                     
54. Id. at 268. 
55. Id. at 277.  
56. Id. at 284.  
57. Lewin, supra note 31, at A1.  
58. WASH. STATE HOSP. ASS’N, END OF LIFE CARE MANUAL § 5 (2015), http://www.wsha.org/wp-
content/uploads/End-of-Life-Care-Manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/68ZX-9HN2]. 
59. ABA COMM’N ON LAW & AGING, supra note 21; Dippel, supra note 50. 
60. ABA COMM’N ON LAW & AGING, supra note 21. 
61. Diane E. Hoffmann, Jack Schwartz & Evan G. DeRenzo, Regulating Research with 
Decisionally Impaired Individuals: Are We Making Progress?, 3 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 547, 
581 (2000). 
62. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(c) (2018). 
63. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39–4504 (West 2019); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 127.505(13), 
127.535(4), 127.635 (West 2019); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.065 (2019). 
64. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3102A(1)-(5) (West 2019); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 127.635(2)(a)–(g); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.065(1)(a)(iii)–(vi). 
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Washington State authorizes default surrogates as (1) spouse or 
registered domestic partner; (2) adult children; (3) parents; and (4) adult 
siblings.65 California, however, does not contemplate a default system; it 
requires patients to orally designate a surrogate.66 
In both statutes and court decisions, “the surrogate [is] expected to 
decide consistent with the patient’s preferences and values (if known), or 
if not known, then consistent with what would be in the patient’s best 
interest.”67 Generally, there are two primary standards for surrogate 
decision-making: “substituted judgment” and “best interest.”68 The 
medical community continues to debate which legal decision-making 
standard is best for patients.69 Furthermore, many states have no 
articulated decision-making standard for guardians of incapacitated 
adults.70 
a. The Substituted Judgment Standard 
In a few states that have articulated decision-making standards, 
surrogates must make decisions following the substituted judgment 
standard.71 Under substituted judgment, surrogates make decisions based 
on the patient’s wishes with as much accuracy as possible.72 If the 
patient did not expressly convey such wishes (e.g., in an advanced 
directive), the surrogate must make an inference based on the patient’s 
statements and conduct prior to incapacity.73 
Without a designated surrogate, physicians may also turn to courts for 
“substituted judgment.”74 One Washington state court held that a trial 
                                                     
65. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.065(1)(a)(iii)–(vi). 
66. CAL. PROB. CODE § 4711 (West 2019). 
67. Hoffmann et al., supra note 61, at 581. 
68. See Lawrence A. Frolik & Linda S. Whitton, The UPC Substituted Judgment/Best Interest 
Standard for Guardian Decisions: A Proposal for Reform, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 739, 742 (2012). 
69. Compare Alexia M. Torke, G. Caleb Alexander & John Lantos, Substituted Judgment: The 
Limitations of Autonomy in Surrogate Decision Making, 23 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1514, 1515–16 
(2008) (advocating for best interest standard or an approach that focuses on dignity instead of 
autonomy), with Norman L. Cantor, Discarding Substituted Judgment and Best Interests: Toward a 
Constructive Preference Standard for Dying, Previously Competent Patients Without Advance 
Instructions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 1193, 1201–41 (1996) (rejecting both substituted judgment and 
best interest standards). 
70. Frolik & Whitton, supra note 68, at 742. 
71. See id. at 743 (“[E]ighteen jurisdictions include some type of substituted judgment language, 
fourteen of which also refer to best interest.”).  
72. See id. at 740; Torke et al., supra note 69, at 1514. 
73. Shana Wynn, Decisions by Surrogates: An Overview of Surrogate Consent Laws in the 
United States, 36 BIFOCAL 10, 12 (2014). 
74. See In re Schuoler, 106 Wash. 2d 500, 723 P.2d 1103 (1986). 
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court may order therapy for a nonconsenting patient only after 
considering and setting forth findings on: (1) the nature of the patient’s 
desires; (2) whether the state has a significant interest in treatment; and 
(3) whether the therapy is necessary and effective to satisfy the state 
interest implicated.75 
Moreover, “[t]he court should consider previous and current 
statements of the patient, religious and moral values of the patient 
regarding medical treatment and electroconvulsive therapy, and views of 
individuals that might influence the patient’s decision.”76 If “the patient 
appears unable to understand fully the nature of the [treatment]—as 
severely mentally ill patients often are—the court should make a 
‘substituted judgment’ for the patient that is analogous to the medical 
treatment decision made for an incompetent person.”77 Finally, the court 
should enter a finding on the nature of the patient’s desires.78 In other 
words, “[t]he goal is not to do what most people would do, or what the 
court believes is the wise thing to do, but rather what this particular 
individual would do if [they] were competent and understood all the 
circumstances, including [their] present and future competency.”79 
While surrogate decision makers and substituted judgment may 
reflect a paternalistic approach, there is a growing movement toward 
recognizing the autonomy of the decisionally impaired.80 Not only are 
advocacy groups—including the disability rights movement and the 
Alzheimer’s Association—active in the debate, but individuals who have 
mental illness and dementia have joined the conversation as well,81 
perhaps exhibiting the autonomy that they seek. 
Arguments against substituted judgment focus on individuals’ 
changing preferences over time.82 A series of studies have shown that 
individuals change their wishes with regard to life-sustaining treatment 
throughout their lives.83 Patients who complete advance directives, 
                                                     
75. Id. at 511, 723 P.2d at 1110. 
76. Id. at 507, 723 P.2d at 1108. 
77. Id. (citing In re Ingram, 102 Wash. 2d 827, 838–42, 689 P.2d 1363, 1369–71 (1984)). 
78. Id. 
79. In re Ingram, 102 Wash. 2d at 839, 689 P.2d at 1369. 
80. Hoffmann et al., supra note 61, at 573; see Arlene Mayerson, 1970’s and Onward—The Civil 
Rights Perspective, in THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF CITIZENS WITH MENTAL RETARDATION 105 
(Lawrence A. Kane, Jr. et al. eds., 1988). 
81. Hoffmann et al., supra note 61, at 573–75.  
82. Torke et al., supra note 69, at 1514. 
83. Id. 
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however, are less likely to change their wishes.84 Therefore, those 
individuals who have not expressed their wishes are the ones for whom 
substituted judgment is least likely to be accurate.85 
b. The Best Interest Standard 
When the patient’s wishes are not or cannot be known, many states 
follow the “best interest” standard.86 According to the best interest 
standard, the surrogate must make decisions that protect the patient’s 
current and future interests.87 The standard is inherently protectionist and 
paternalistic.88 Courts have defined “best interests” in terms of what a 
“reasonable person” would decide in the same situation.89 
Courts often apply the best interest standard to minors.90 For example, 
if parents refuse “to authorize needed life-saving blood transfusions, 
doctors have a moral and legal duty to help the child and notify the 
courts.”91 Once the state proves, “often by clear and convincing 
evidence, that the child has suffered or is in danger of suffering serious 
harm,” then judges may “choose the best available option for the 
child.”92 
The Washington State Supreme Court, however, applied this standard 
to an adult who never had the ability to form genuine preferences.93 In In 
re Hamlin,94 the court upheld the best interest standard for a terminally 
ill adult with severe mental impairment since birth.95 In finding that the 
                                                     
84. Id. 
85. Id.  
86. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.065(1)(c) (2019) (“[T]he [surrogate] must first determine 
in good faith that that patient, if competent, would consent to the proposed health care. If such a 
determination cannot be made, the decision to consent to the proposed health care may be made 
only after determining that the proposed health care is in the patient’s best interests.” (emphasis 
added)).  
87. Dippel, supra note 50, at 668. 
88. Nancy K. Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102 HARV. L. REV. 375, 398–401 (1988).  
89. Loretta M. Kopelman, The Best Interest Standard for Incompetent or Incapacitated Persons 
of All Ages, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 187, 188 (2007). 
90. Id.  
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
93. In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 819–20, 689 P.2d 1372, 1378 (1984); see also id. at 821, 
689 P.2d at 1379 (recognizing that “[t]he problem before us involves social, moral and ethical 
considerations as well complex legal and medical issues for which the legislative process is best 
suited to address in a comprehensive manner”). 
94. In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 819–20, 689 P.2d 1372, 1378 (1984). 
95. Id. 
12 - Louie (2).docx (Do Not Delete) 6/18/2019  7:55 PM 
898 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:887 
 
individual never had the ability to form genuine preferences or express 
his wishes about the termination of life support, the court found that the 
best interest standard applied.96 
Although surrogates should have a “prima facie duty” to “maximize 
the person’s overall or long term benefits and minimize burdens”97 under 
the best interest standard, it remains unclear whose determination 
controls—clinicians, surrogates, or courts.98 In 2005, the President’s 
Council on Bioethics99 described surrogate decision-making duties under 
the best interest standard: “Ultimately, caregivers must compare the 
burdens, consequences, and potential complications of the treatment 
itself against the burdens, consequences, and potential complications of 
non-treatment; and they must compare the likely realities of life after 
treatment against the likely realities of life without treatment.”100 
Some scholars continue to advocate for the best interest standard for 
incompetent adults.101 Recognizing the standard’s inherent paternalism, 
refined approaches include basing “best interest” on community 
norms.102 Most of this commentary, however, is focused on medical 
treatment or end of life decision making, not biomedical research.103 
c. Hybrid Standard Model 
At least fourteen state surrogate decision-making statutes mention 
both the best interest and the substituted judgment standards.104 Three 
states that use both standards, however, do not indicate what relative 
weight surrogates are to give either standard.105 In evaluating these 
                                                     
96. Id. 
97. Kopelman, supra note 89, at 188 (arguing for the best interest standard). 
98. See id. 
99. Exec. Order No. 13,237, 66 Fed. Reg. 59,851 (Nov. 28, 2001) (establishing Council to advise 
the administration on bioethics consisting of no more than eighteen members appointed for two-year 
terms), superseded by Exec. Order No. 13,521, 74 Fed. Reg. 62,671 (Nov. 24, 2009) (establishing 
the Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues). 
100. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, TAKING CARE: ETHICAL CAREGIVING IN OUR AGING 
SOCIETY 176 (2005). 
101. See Torke et al., supra note 69, at 1515. 
102. Id. (citing Rebecca Dresser, Precommitment: A Misguided Strategy for Securing Death with 
Dignity, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1823 (2003)).  
103. See id. 
104. Frolik & Whitton, supra note 68, at 743; Nina A. Kohn & Jeremy A. Blumenthal, 
Designating Health Care Decisionmakers for Patients Without Advance Directives: A 
Psychological Critique, 42 GA. L. REV. 979, 986 (2008); see also WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 7.70.065(1)(c) (2019).  
105. Frolik & Whitton, supra note 68, at 746. 
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statutes, scholars have recognized that all lacked adequate guidance for 
decision-making.106 “Ironically, while dual mandate-type 
statutes . . . may deter unreasonable decisions, they also deprive 
incapacitated persons of the right to substituted judgments that produce 
reasonable outcomes.”107 
To establish a more workable standard, scholars Lawrence Frolik and 
Linda Whitton offer a model that breaks down the standards into 
“Expanded” and “Strict” categories and establishes a sliding scale.108 
With “Expanded Best Interest,” “guardians may base their decisions on 
the benefits and burdens for the incapacitated person, as discerned from 
available information, including the views of professionals and others 
with sufficient interest in the incapacitated person’s welfare.”109 
Decisions may also include consideration of consequences for others 
that a reasonable person in the incapacitated person’s circumstances 
would consider.110 If following “Strict Best Interest,” however, 
guardians should base their decisions solely on the benefits for, and 
burdens on, the incapacitated person as discerned from available 
information.111 
2. Advance directives and Durable Powers of Attorney 
Surrogate decision-makers may also rely on an incapacitated 
individual’s advanced directive or durable power of attorney 
assignment.112 Cruzan established a high evidentiary standard for 
patients’ preferences prior to incompetence.113 This decision partially led 
to the creation of advance directives as a tool for patients to execute their 
wishes before any future incompetence.114 An advanced directive is a 
written contract that establishes an individual’s medical wishes should 
they become incompetent or incapacitated.115 Individuals may draft and 
sign an advanced directive while still competent, and it is enforceable if 
that person loses the ability to consent.116 For example, the individual 
                                                     
106. Id. at 747. 
107. Id. at 750. 
108. Id. at 751–52.  
109. Id. at 751.  
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 752.  
112. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 7.70.065(1)(a)(ii), 11.125.030 (2019).  
113. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 284 (1990).  
114. See Scott, supra note 31, at 268–69. 
115. See id. at 269; Dippel, supra note 50, at 664–66.  
116. Dippel, supra note 50, at 665–66. 
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may express their wish to refuse or withhold life-sustaining treatment at 
a certain point.117 Healthcare advance directives have become a standard 
part of estate planning, yet most forms do not include medical research 
wishes.118 
The American Bar Association (ABA) Commission on Law and 
Aging offers a variety of advanced directive and surrogate decision-
making resources.119 The Commission’s resources include guidance on 
choosing a health care proxy, a proxy quiz, and power of attorney 
forms.120 None of these forms, however, mention or include any 
information on participating in research or clinical trials.121 
Following the Cruzan decision, the ABA Commission on Law and 
Aging partnered with Aging with Dignity to develop an advance 
directives model to meet legal evidentiary requirements.122 This work 
resulted in the popular “Five Wishes” model accepted in forty-two 
states.123 Five Wishes includes two legal documents and other matters of 
comfort care and final wishes.124 Wish 1 assigns a health care 
surrogate.125 Wish 2 addresses what kind of end-of-life medical 
treatment a patient desires.126 Nevertheless, none of the five wishes 
include research participation.127 
To resolve the challenges of surrogate decision-making, individuals 
may elect to execute Durable Powers of Attorney (DPOA) for Health 
                                                     
117. Id. at 642. 
118. Id.; see Sample Health Care Directive (or Living Will), WASH. STATE HOSP. ASS’N, 
http://www.wsha.org/wp-content/uploads/End-of-Life_LivingWill.pdf [https://perma.cc/9RNR-
NENB]; Sample Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care, WASH. STATE HOSP. ASS’N, 
http://www.wsha.org/wp-content/uploads/End-of-Life_Durable_Power_Attorney.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/C42A-KZ8A]. 
119. ABA COMM’N ON LAW & AGING, HEALTH CARE DECISION-MAKING (Feb. 27, 2019), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/law_aging/resources/health_care_decision_making.html 
[https://perma.cc/DZ84-DASM].  
120. Id.  
121. Id.; see also ABA COMM’N ON LAW & AGING, GUIDE FOR HEALTH CARE PROXIES TOOL #9, 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/law_aging/tool9.authcheckdam.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8FRD-TUL5].  
122. Frank Davies, Living Will from Florida Goes Nationwide, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 23, 1998, at A8. 
123. History and Mission, AGING WITH DIGNITY, https://www.agingwithdignity.org/about-
us/history-and-mission [https://perma.cc/7CR6-JJYK].  
124. Id.  
125. AGING WITH DIGNITY, SAMPLE FIVE WISHES FORM 4 (2011), https://fivewishes.org/docs/ 
default-source/Samples/five-wishes-sample.pdf [https://perma.cc/AZG4-FNLF]. 
126. Id. at 6–7. 
127. Id. at 1–11. 
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Care and expressly convey their wishes.128 Standard DPOA forms 
establish clear wishes of the individual, and specialized Health Care 
DPOAs are becoming more common.129 Despite growing public 
discourse, only about 60% of individuals over the age of fifty have 
executed a living will in the United States.130 Rates of individuals with 
wills vary by income and education.131 To address these gaps, several 
states have recently adopted uniform DPOA statutes to complement 
informed consent and guardianship statutes.132 For example, Washington 
State enacted the Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act in 2016,133 
becoming the twentieth state to pass such a law.134 The uniform acts 
provide default rules in case of future incapacity135 and contain 
safeguards for the protection of an incapacitated principal in the medical 
treatment context.136 
II. LEGAL INCAPACITY IN THE MEDICAL RESEARCH 
CONTEXT 
Despite varied state statutes, informed consent for patients who lack 
capacity is fairly well settled in the clinical setting.137 The various 
surrogate decision-making standards in that context—substituted 
judgment or best interest—are primarily focused on the benefits of 
treatment for, or the desires of, that particular patient.138 
Informed consent for individuals who lack capacity in the research 
context, however, is much less clear. The main distinction between 
medical treatment and medical research is their respective purpose. The 
purpose of research is not necessarily to heal the patient, but rather a 
                                                     
128. See Scott, supra note 31, at 269.  
129. See, e.g., WASH. STATE HOSP. ASS’N, supra note 58. 
130. AARP RESEARCH GRP., WHERE THERE IS A WILL . . . LEGAL DOCUMENTS AMONG THE 50+ 
POPULATION: FINDINGS FROM AN AARP SURVEY 2 (2000), 
https://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/econ/will.pdf [https://perma.cc/KY4H-32VS]. 
131. Id. at 2–3 (noting how “[t]here is a dramatic increase in the proportion of the 50+ population 
having a will as household income increases from less than $15,000 annually (50% with a will) to 
$50,000 and over (74% with a will)” and “[p]eople with a college degree or higher levels of 
education are much more likely to have a will than those with a high school education or less”). 
132. Power of Attorney Act, supra note 23. 
133. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.125.010 (2018); see also id. § 11.125.400. 
134.  Power of Attorney Act, supra note 23. 
135. Id.  
136. See WASH. REV. CODE § 11.125.400. 
137. See In re Conservatorship of Groves, 109 S.W.3d 317, 328–30 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). 
138. See Dippel, supra note 50, at 667–68. 
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scientific endeavor to discover and learn from the subject and his or her 
ailment.139 In other words, when a patient consents to medical treatment, 
they are consenting to potential risks with the ultimate goal of getting 
better (i.e., therapeutic).140 Conversely, when a patient consents to 
medical research, they are consenting to potential risks, with the 
possibility of getting better, but with the understanding that they may, in 
fact, get worse, and with the ultimate goal of contributing to science 
(i.e., nontherapeutic).141 
During the informed consent process, it is critical for research 
participants to understand the distinction between research and 
treatment. This challenge, often called the “therapeutic misconception,” 
can be heightened in research involving subjects with impaired decision-
making capacity.142 Enrollment poses its own unique challenges as well: 
Enrollment of subjects with partial impairment may require 
modifications to the consent form and process to enable those 
subjects to consent on their own behalf. When a subject’s 
consent capacity is sufficiently impaired that the subject is 
unable to provide legally effective informed consent, the subject 
may not be enrolled unless the subject’s legally authorized 
representative consents on the subject’s behalf.143 
Considering the history of abuse on vulnerable populations for 
“research purposes”—e.g., Tuskegee144 and Nazi experimentation145—
the global community recognizes ethical and legal standards must apply 
in the research context.146 Following WWII, the Nuremburg Code 
                                                     
139. See Russell Korobkin, Autonomy and Informed Consent in Nontherapeutic Biomedical 
Research, 54 UCLA L. REV. 605, 611 (2007). 
140. See Katz, supra note 29, at 76–77. 
141. See Joseph L. Breault, Protecting Human Research Subjects: The Past Defines the Future, 6 
OCHSNER J. 15 (2006); Lars Noah, Informed Consent and The Elusive Dichotomy Between Standard 
and Experimental Therapy, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 361 (2002). 
142. Research Involving Individuals with Questionable Capacity to Consent: Points to Consider, 
NAT’L INST. HEALTH (Nov. 2009), https://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/questionablecapacity.htm 
[https://perma.cc/8SSL-TTV7] [hereinafter NAT’L INST. HEALTH]. 
143. OFFICE OF GOOD CLINICAL PRACTICE, OFFICE OF SPECIAL MED. PROGRAMS & OFFICE OF 
MED. PRODS. & TOBACCO, FDA, INFORMED CONSENT INFORMATION SHEET: GUIDANCE FOR IRBS, 
CLINICAL INVESTIGATORS, AND SPONSORS, DRAFT GUIDANCE 35 (2014) (citing 21 C.F.R. 
§§ 50.3(l), 50.20 (2018)) [hereinafter FDA INFORMED CONSENT INFORMATION SHEET]. 
144. Sharona Hoffman, Regulating Clinical Research: Informed Consent, Privacy, and IRBs, 31 
CAP. U. L. REV. 71, 74 (2003). 
145. Peter V. Rabins, Issues Raised by Research Using Persons Suffering from Dementia Who 
Have Impaired Decisional Capacity, 1 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 22 (1998). 
146. See U.S. GOV’T PRINTING OFFICE, TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG 
MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 181–82 (1949) (“1. The 
voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential.”). 
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established early standards.147 In 1993, the Council for International 
Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS), in collaboration with the 
World Health Organization (WHO), released international research 
guidelines.148 Human subjects research standards evolved in the United 
States consistent with these international standards.149 
A. Federal Regulatory and Legal Framework for Human Subjects 
Research 
In the United States, the former Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare (DHEW) first addressed the question of informed consent for 
those lacking decisional capacity in the research context in 1973.150 A 
DHEW appointed study group published a report raising the ambiguity 
of consent in the research context: 
Whereas it is clear by law that consent of a parent or legal 
representative is valid for established and generally accepted 
therapeutic procedures performed on a child or an incompetent 
adult, it is far from clear that it is adequate for research 
procedures. In practice, parental or guardian consent generally 
has been accepted as adequate for therapeutic research, although 
the issue has not been definitively resolved in the courts. When 
research might expose a subject to risk without defined 
therapeutic benefit or other positive effect on that subject’s well-
being, parental or guardian consent appears to be insufficient.151 
The draft also raised the concern that legal guardians might not 
always have the “best interest” of the patient in decision-making.152 
Because “long-term management of patients with mental disabilities is 
expensive and time-consuming[,]”153 the draft speculated that a research 
proposal that might “reduce either the expense or the supervision 
                                                     
147. Id. 
148. See Robert J. Levine, New International Ethical Guidelines for Research Involving Human 
Subjects, 119 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 339 (1993). 
149. See Joel Sparks, Timeline of Laws Related to the Protection of Human Subjects, NAT’L INST. 
HEALTH (June 2002), https://history.nih.gov/about/timelines_laws_human.html 
[https://perma.cc/G4G5-56SW] (discussing how from 1980 to 1983, the President’s Commission’s 
recommendations became the basis of the Common Rule, and how, in 1991, sixteen agencies 
adopted the Common Rule regulations). 
150. Hoffmann et al., supra note 61, at 551. 
151. Protection of Human Subjects: Policies and Procedures, 38 Fed. Reg. 31,738 (Nov. 16, 
1973). 
152. Hoffmann et al., supra note 61, at 552 n.23. 
153. Protection of Human Subjects: Policies and Procedures, supra note 151, at 31,745. 
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required in caring for such persons might be appealing, whether or not 
there is correlative benefit to the patient.”154 
For individuals who lack capacity, the draft contemplated a 
supplemental model: “assent” instead of “consent.”155 Researchers may 
require assent when the individual has “sufficient mental competency to 
understand what is proposed and to express an opinion as to his or her 
participation.”156 After Congress abandoned the DHEW proposals, it 
charged later commissions with establishing principles and guidelines 
for “the protection of human subjects of research.”157 This work 
culminated in the Belmont Report in 1979.158 Following the report’s 
publication, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
promulgated regulations for research involving human subjects, known 
as the “Common Rule.”159 The Common Rule established guidelines for 
informed consent in research.160 The regulations identify several 
elements required for legally effective informed consent.161 The three 
main elements are: (1) information; (2) comprehension; and 
(3) voluntariness.162 Importantly, the Common Rule does not contain a 
specific subpart governing research involving adults with impaired 
decision-making capacity.163 
The National Institutes of Health (NIH) considers “consent capacity” 
as “an adult’s ability to understand information relevant to making an 
informed, voluntary decision to participate in research.”164 With respect 
to individuals who lack consent, the NIH contemplates various scenarios 
impacting capacity.165 “Impaired consent capacity may involve partial 
impairment, impairment that fluctuates over time, or complete 
impairment. For example, consent capacity can be affected by a wide 
                                                     
154. Id.  
155. Hoffmann et al., supra note 61, at 553. 
156. Protection of Human Subjects: Policies and Procedures, supra note 151, at 31,748.  
157. Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of 
Research, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,192 (Apr. 18, 1979) [hereinafter Belmont Report]. 
158. Id.  
159. 45 C.F.R. § 46 (2018); Alison Wichman, Protecting Vulnerable Research Subjects: 
Practical Realities of Institutional Review Board Review and Approval, 1 J. HEALTH CARE L. & 
POL’Y 88, 89 (1998). 
160. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116.  
161. Id.  
162. Protection of Human Subjects: Policies and Procedures, supra note 151, at 31,740.  
163. Stacey A. Tovino, A “Common” Proposal, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 787, 801 (2013); see 45 
C.F.R. §§ 46.101–.505.  
164. NAT’L INST. HEALTH, supra note 142.  
165. Id. 
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range of disorders and conditions, such as dementia, stroke, traumatic 
brain injury, developmental disorders, serious mental illness, 
intoxication, and delirium.”166 
The leading case on informed consent in research, Grimes v. Kennedy 
Krieger Institute, Inc.,167 involved a lead poisoning study on children in 
Baltimore.168 In finding that a “special relationship” giving rise to a duty 
of care exists between researchers and subjects, the Grimes Court based 
their reasoning on contract law.169 The court found that: 
[I]nformed consent agreements in nontherapeutic research 
projects, under certain circumstances can constitute contracts; 
and that, under certain circumstances, such research agreements 
can, as a matter of law, constitute “special relationships” giving 
rise to duties, out of the breach of which negligence actions may 
arise. . . . Additionally, we hold that governmental regulations 
can create duties on the part of researchers towards human 
subjects out of which “special relationships” can arise.170 
Along with the Grimes decision, at least nineteen published opinions 
from state and federal courts recognize “the duty of researchers to secure 
an informed consent from research participants.”171 
1. Federal Ambiguity on Proxy Consent and the Revised Common 
Rule 
U.S. regulations follow informed consent doctrine for surrogate 
decision makers.172 Department guidance has also stated preferences on 
the most appropriate standard in the research context, particularly 
involving subjects with impaired capacity.173 For example, NIH prefers 
the substituted judgment standard, in which LARs’ research decisions 
are “guided by their knowledge of the beliefs, views, and preferences of 
the subject.”174 Furthermore, substituted judgment is favored “from an 
ethical standpoint because it is consistent with the principles of respect 
                                                     
166. FDA INFORMED CONSENT INFORMATION SHEET, supra note 143 (emphasis added). 
167. 782 A.2d 807 (Md. 2001). 
168. See id. at 811–12.  
169. Id. at 858. 
170. Id. (emphasis added). 
171. Jon F. Merz, The Nuremberg Code and Informed Consent for Research, 319 J. AM. MED. 
ASS’N 85 (2018). 
172. Elyn R. Saks et al., Proxy Consent to Research: The Legal Landscape, 8 YALE J. HEALTH 
POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 37, 44 (2008) (“The term LAR occurs in state statutes approximately 295 times.”). 
173. See NAT’L INST. HEALTH, supra note 142. 
174. Id. 
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for persons and autonomy, which are central to informed consent.”175 
NIH, however, stipulates that “[i]n the absence of knowledge of subject 
values, the best interest standard is typically used.”176 
The Belmont Report also contemplates utilizing the “best interest” 
standard in medical research.177 The report states that LARs “should be 
those who are most likely to understand the incompetent subject’s 
situation and to act in that person’s best interests.”178 It does, however, 
specify the appropriate context for applying this standard: LARs “should 
be given an opportunity to observe the research as it proceeds in order to 
be able to withdraw the subject from the research, if such action appears 
in the subject’s best interest.”179 
The HHS Office of Human Research Protections (OHRP) seemingly 
interprets the existence of a family proxy consent to treatment statute as 
also authorizing proxy consent to research.180 OHRP, therefore, defers to 
state statutes but has explicitly disallowed researchers to act based on 
statutes that allowed a non-LAR to consent.181 On the OHRP website’s 
Frequently Asked Questions page, the agency acknowledges that “HHS 
regulations are silent on the consent procedures specific to subjects with 
impaired decision-making capacity.”182 
In 2017, several agencies updated the Common Rule in a new Final 
Rule.183 After the release of the Proposed Rule in 2011,184 agencies 
received extensive public comment and several proposals to address 
proxy consent in research.185 In response, the Final Rule “modified” the 
definition of LARs “to address jurisdictions in which no applicable law 
authorizes a legally authorized representative to provide consent on 
                                                     
175. Id. 
176. Id. (emphasis added). 
177. Belmont Report, supra note 157. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. 
180. Saks et al., supra note 172, at 52. 
181. Id. at 54–55. 
182. Informed Consent FAQs, HHS, https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-and-
policy/guidance/faq/informed-consent/index.html [https://perma.cc/2HYH-8TXW]. 
183. See 45 C.F.R. § 46 (2018). 
184. See Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for Research Subjects and 
Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for Investigators, 75 Fed. Reg. 44,512 (proposed July 26, 
2011). 
185. See Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, supra note 25, at 7,170–71; 
Tovino, supra note 163, at 787, 846–53 (proposing that “HHS amend the Common Rule to add a 
new Subpart E governing human subjects research involving adults with impaired decision-making 
capacity”). 
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behalf of a prospective research subject.”186 The Final Rule extends the 
definition of LAR to “an individual recognized by institutional policy as 
acceptable for providing consent in the nonresearch context.”187 
Nevertheless, this change leaves considerable confusion among differing 
state statutes and IRB practices on proxy consent.188 For example, the 
Final Rule does not define “institutional policy.”189 Ultimately, the 
updated Common Rule does not offer a much-needed uniform approach 
to proxy consent that researchers, potential subjects, and their surrogates 
can follow. 
2. Minimal Risk Standards 
Some scholars argue that nontherapeutic research involving mentally 
impaired subjects is legitimate only if it involves minimal risk.190 Others, 
like the court in T.D. v. New York State Office of Mental Health,191 hold 
that this type of research may not be permissible precisely because of the 
challenge of informed consent. The trial court stated: 
When the proposed medical course does not involve an 
emergency and is not for the purpose of bettering the patient’s 
condition, or ending suffering, it may be doubtful if a surrogate 
decisionmaker—a guardian, a committee, a health-care proxy 
holder, a relative, or even a parent could properly give consent 
to permitting a ward to be used in experimental research with no 
prospect of direct therapeutic benefit to the patient himself.192 
Either way, “a core concern a [psychiatrist] should have when a patient 
with AD is considering enrollment in a study is how great a risk the 
patient is willing to take.”193 
While ethical obligations to protect vulnerable populations from 
research are well-founded, a conundrum lies “[b]ecause new treatments 
                                                     
186. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, supra note 25, at 7,171. 
187. Id. at 7,260 (“If there is no applicable law . . . an individual recognized by institutional 
policy as acceptable for providing consent in the nonresearch context to the subject’s participation 
in the procedures involved in the research, will now be considered a legally authorized 
representative for purposes of this rule.”). 
188. See Ng Gong et al., supra note 28; ABA COMM’N ON LAW & AGING, supra note 21. 
189. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, supra note 25, at 7,171. 
190. See Stacey A. Tovino, Conflicts of Interest in Medicine, Research, and Law: A Comparison, 
117 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1291, 1316–17 (2013). 
191. 690 N.E.2d 1259, 1260 (N.Y. 1997). 
192. T.D. v. N.Y. State Office of Mental Health, 626 N.Y.S.2d 1015, 1020 (App. Div. 1995). 
193. Edmund Howe, Informed Consent, Participation in Research, and the Alzheimer’s Patient, 
9 INNOVATIONS CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 47, 48 (2012). 
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must eventually be tested in persons suffering from the relevant 
condition . . . [E]xcluding incapable subjects from research would 
preclude the development of improved treatment for persons with 
serious psychiatric disorders, dementia, and other mentally debilitating 
conditions.”194 
Despite this dilemma, U.S. regulations adopted risk-level limitations 
on research. Under the Common Rule, “minimal risk” means that “the 
probability and magnitude of harm or discomfort anticipated in the 
research are not greater in and of themselves than those ordinarily 
encountered in daily life or during the routine physical or psychological 
examinations or tests.”195 
The Grimes Court acknowledged different levels of risk and 
prohibited proxy consent in studies with high risk.196 The court held that 
“a parent . . . or other applicable surrogate, cannot consent to the 
participation of a child or other person under legal disability in 
nontherapeutic research or studies in which there is any risk of injury or 
damage to the health of the subject.”197 Thus, Grimes presents a potential 
barrier to innovative research. 
Some agencies issued clarifying guidance to establish their policy 
preferences on research on mentally impaired subjects that entail greater 
risk.198 For example, NIH has stated that enrolling subjects with 
impaired decision-making capacity “is crucial to the development of 
new treatments and diagnostic and preventative strategies.”199 NIH 
further recognizes that “[r]esearch that does not directly benefit the 
individual subject can be of benefit to family members, other people at-
risk for or with the condition, and society as a whole by advancing 
                                                     
194. Rebecca Dresser, Research Involving Persons with Mental Disabilities: A Review of Policy 
Issues and Proposals, in 1 NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, RESEARCH INVOLVING PERSONS 
WITH MENTAL DISORDERS THAT MAY AFFECT DECISIONMAKING CAPACITY 5, 7 (1998), 
https://bioethicsarchive.georgetown.edu/nbac/capacity/volumeii.pdf [https://perma.cc/BHE2-DQKC]. 
195. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(j) (2018). 
196. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 858 (Md. 2001). 
197. Id. (emphasis added). 
198. See, e.g., NAT’L INST. HEALTH, supra note 142 (explaining “[t]he purpose of this document 
is to provide investigators and [] (IRBs) with points to consider in: a) fulfilling ethical and Federal 
regulatory requirements to ensure the protection of the rights and welfare of research subjects who, 
due to impairments in their capacity to give informed consent, may be vulnerable to coercion or 
undue influence; and b) maintaining appropriate awareness of the ethical challenges associated with 
research involving this vulnerable population. Impaired decision-making capacity need not prevent 
participation in research, but additional scrutiny and safeguards are warranted for research involving 
individuals with such impairments.”). 
199. Id. 
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scientific knowledge of the condition or disorder.”200 In other words, 
research of particular diseases “may have no direct medical benefit to 
subjects, but will likely advance knowledge and may lead to new 
strategies to diagnose, treat, and prevent disease.”201 
The National Institute for Mental Health (NIMH) permits studies on 
mentally impaired subjects only if researchers employ an appropriate 
consent process.202 The agency further stipulates that the research must 
involve either: (1) minimal risk, (2) greater than minimal risk but with 
the prospect of direct benefit to subjects, or (3) greater than minimal risk 
with no prospect of direct benefit to subjects but with the likelihood of 
gaining important knowledge about the subject’s illness.203 
a. Attitudes Towards Research with Greater Risk 
In a 2000 study, researchers assessed inpatient adults at the NIH 
Clinical Center on research preferences in the event of future 
incapacity.204 Of 2,371 adults surveyed, 11% completed a research 
advance directive.205 Of these, 13% were not willing to participate in 
future research should they become unable to consent.206 Conversely, 
76% were willing to participate in research that might help them, but just 
less than half were willing to participate in research that would not help 
them and only posed minimal risk.207 Finally, only 9% of those surveyed 
were willing to participate in research that would not help them and 
posed greater than minimal risk.208 This study, however, did not focus on 
AD patients.209 
A 2005 study focused on individuals with a heightened risk of AD 
and their thoughts about surrogate consent for research.210 The study 
found that participants did express preferences among research scenarios 
                                                     
200. Id. 
201. Id. 
202. LEWIS VAUGHN, BIOETHICS: PRINCIPLES, ISSUES, AND CASES 249 (3d ed. 2017). 
203. Id. 
204. Palaniappan Muthappan, Heidi Forster & David Wendler, Research Advance Directives: 
Protection or Obstacle?, 162 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 2389 (2005). 
205. Id. at 2390. 
206. Id. 
207. Id. 
208. Id. 
209. Id. 
210. Scott Y.H. Kim et al., What Do People at Risk for Alzheimer Disease Think About Surrogate 
Consent for Research?, 65 NEUROLOGY 1395 (2005). 
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of varying risks and burdens.211 The individuals, however, were 
supportive of surrogate consent-based research even when risks and 
burdens were significant to the subjects.212 
A more recent 2017 University of California Los Angeles (UCLA) 
Alzheimer’s Disease Research Center (ADRC) study found similar 
results with AD patients ranging from normal cognition, Mild Cognitive 
Impairment (MCI), and clinically diagnosed dementia.213 The UCLA 
study had two significant findings.214 First, individuals with a more 
severe diagnosis indicated greater willingness to participate in research, 
regardless of risk.215 Second, however, with greater research risk and 
burden, willingness to participate reduced in each diagnostic group.216 
Therefore, the minimal risk standard remains a significant limitation 
on research to protect subjects who lack capacity. Individuals with AD 
diagnoses, however, may be more willing to participate in research with 
greater than minimal risk. It is important for those AD subjects to 
express their wishes for potential future substituted judgment. 
3. Assent and Dissent Standards 
The Common Rule identifies one class of vulnerable subjects with 
special regulations: minors.217 These regulations set an additional 
standard for these subjects, who also lack the legal capacity to 
consent.218 The modification afforded to minor subjects—based on the 
fundamental principles of patient autonomy219—is a requirement for 
“assent.”220 Assent is defined as “a child’s affirmative agreement to 
participate in research. Mere failure to object should not, absent 
affirmative agreement, be construed as assent.”221 In determining 
                                                     
211. Id. at 1395. 
212. Id.  
213. Michelle M. Nuno et al., Attitudes Toward Clinical Trials Across the Alzheimer’s Disease 
Spectrum, ALZHEIMER’S RES. & THERAPY 3 (2017), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/ 
articles/PMC5628443/pdf/13195_2017_Article_311.pdf [https://perma.cc/S6Q8-2VUJ]. 
214. Id. at 4. 
215. Id. 
216. Id. 
217. 45 C.F.R. § 46.401–.409 (2018). 
218. Id. § 46.408. 
219. See Wilma C. Rossi, William Reynolds & Robert M. Nelson, Child Assent and Parental 
Permission in Pediatric Research, 24 THEORETICAL MED. & BIOETHICS 131, 132–33 (2003). 
220. 45 C.F.R. § 46.408. 
221. Id. § 46.402(b). 
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whether children are capable of providing assent, researchers must 
consider the subject’s age, maturity, and psychological state.222 
Seeking assent and respecting dissent is not legally equivalent to 
obtaining informed consent but maintains the dignity of all persons 
participating in research.223 While regulations do not require assent for 
dementia research, it has been contemplated and recommended.224 In 
fact, one recently published trial adopted the assent approach.225 The 
trial, however, involved individuals with mild dementia and requested 
written consent from all trial participants.226 
B. The Role of Institutional Review Boards 
IRBs are private, independent groups that approve or deny proposed 
medical research.227 The FDA defines IRBs as “any board, committee, or 
other group formally designated by an institution to review, to approve 
the initiation of, and to conduct periodic review of, biomedical research 
involving human subjects.”228 The purpose of IRBs role “is to assure the 
protection of the rights and welfare of the human subjects.”229 
Substantive legal and policy guidelines instruct investigators and 
IRBs on the ethical propriety of research proposals.230 The FDA advises 
that IRBs and principal investigators “carefully consider” whether the 
participation of research subjects who lack consent capacity is “ethically 
appropriate and scientifically necessary.”231 The agency offers further 
guidance to address ethical and procedural challenges, including: 
Establishing a waiting period in the decision-making process to 
allow additional time for decision-making[;] [u]sing methods to 
enhance consent capacity, for example, through 
                                                     
222. Id. § 46.408. 
223. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, FOR RESEARCHERS: 
NEUROSCIENCE AND CONSENT CAPACITY 5 (2015), https://bioethicsarchive.georgetown.edu/pcsbi/sites 
/default/files/consent%20capacity%20primer%20-%20FINAL_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q6B2-EW9H]. 
224. Betty S. Black et al., Seeking Assent and Respecting Dissent in Dementia Research, 18 AM. 
J. GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY 77 (2010); Susan Slaughter et al., Consent and Assent to Participate in 
Research from People with Dementia, 14 NURSING ETHICS 27 (2007).  
225. See Lawrence S. Honig et al., Trial of Solanezumab for Mild Dementia Due to Alzheimer’s 
Disease, 378 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 321 (2018). 
226. Id. at 323. 
227. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(g)–(h). 
228. 21 C.F.R. § 56.102(g) (2018). 
229. Id. 
230. Marshall B. Kapp, Decisional Capacity, Older Human Research Subjects, and IRBs: Beyond 
Forms and Guidelines, 9 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 359 (1998). 
231. FDA INFORMED CONSENT INFORMATION SHEET, supra note 143, at 35. 
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(i) simplification and/or repetition of information, 
(ii) involvement of a subject advocate or trusted family 
member/friend to assist when sharing information about the 
clinical investigation . . . [and] [i]nvolving a legally authorized 
representative either initially or later in the clinical investigation 
if consent capacity diminishes.”232 
C. State Statutes Are Inconsistent on Proxy Consent in Research 
Several state statutes contemplate proxy consent in the research 
context.233 However, “[n]o state comprehensively regulates research 
with decisionally impaired individuals.”234 Many jurisdictions do not 
explicitly speak to the issue,235 though some scholars posit that it cannot 
be “presumed that absence of a statute necessarily means that proxy 
consent to research is not permitted.”236 In other words, health care 
surrogate decision-making statutes could be inferred to apply in the 
research context.237 Twenty-seven states have laws regarding proxy 
consent to research generally, though many are limited to specific types 
of experimental research or require court orders.238 For example, 
Washington state has several statutes addressing informed consent and 
individuals who lack capacity,239 yet only one explicitly mentions 
experimental research, and it specifically relates to nursing home 
patients.240 Three states, however, explicitly prohibit or limit health care 
surrogates from consenting to research on behalf of the patient.241 Some 
of these statutes, though, include language that allows for patients’ 
express wishes to be upheld over the defaults.242 
                                                     
232. Id. at 36 (emphasis added). 
233. Saks et al., supra note 172, at 46. 
234. Hoffmann et al., supra note 61, at 550. 
235. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 70.70.065 (2019) (providing for surrogate consent only in the 
context of “health care”). 
236. Saks et al., supra note 172, at 46. 
237. Id. at 80–84. 
238. Id. at 42. 
239. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 7.70.060, 11.88.010, 74.42.040 (2019). 
240. Id. § 74.42.040. 
241. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.113 (West 2019); NEV. REV. STAT. § 162A.850 (2019) (“The agent 
may not consent to: . . . (g) Experimental medical, biomedical or behavioral treatment, or 
participation in any medical, biomedical or behavior research program.”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 137-J:5 V(d) (2019) (“Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to give an agent or surrogate 
authority to . . . [c]onsent to . . . experimental treatment of any kind.”). 
242. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.113(1) (“Unless the principal expressly delegates such 
authority to the surrogate in writing . . . a surrogate or proxy may not provide consent 
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1. Specialized State Statutes 
In 2002, California passed a law explicitly allowing proxy consent for 
research.243 The legislature passed the law partly in response to a UCLA 
moratorium on approval of human subjects research involving 
decisionally-impaired participants unless a court-appointed conservator 
obtained consent.244 UCLA made this decision due to the lack of 
certainty or guidance on surrogate consent to research.245 
The California law restricts proxy consent to medical experiments 
that relate to the cognitive impairment or lack of capacity of the research 
participants.246 This would likely include AD research. Further, the law 
prioritizes the “substituted judgment” decision-making standard but 
allows for “best interest” standard when patient wishes are unknown.247 
To avoid decisions based solely on minimal risk, the law specifies “[i]n 
determining the person’s best interest, the decisionmaker shall consider 
the person’s personal values and his or her best estimate of what the 
person would have chosen if he or she were capable of making a 
decision.”248 
Several other states followed California’s model.249 Kansas has a 
specific provision allowing proxy consent, although it is restricted to 
IRB-approved research protocols and prohibits consent if contrary to the 
incompetent patient’s permission, expressed orally or in writing.250 New 
Jersey also limited proxy consent to IRB-approved and monitored 
research, as well as certain benefit/risk criteria.251 
Conversely, many states restrict surrogate health care decision-
making to specific decisions. For example, North Carolina’s living will 
statute limits proxy consent to the withholding or withdrawing of life-
                                                     
for . . . experimental treatments that have not been approved by a federally approved institutional 
review board.”). 
243. 2002 Cal. Legis. Serv. 477 (West) (codified at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24178 
(West 2019)).  
244. Saks et al., supra note 172, at 40–41. 
245. Id. 
246. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24178. 
247. Id. § 24178(g). 
248. Id. 
249. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4974 (West 2019) (specialized provision applicable only to 
consent in medical research); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:14-5 (West 2019); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, 
§ 3102A (West 2019). 
250. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4974. 
251. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:14-5. 
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prolonging measures.252 Many jurisdictions follow this approach—
perhaps in response to Cruzan—continuing to focus health care 
surrogate decision-making on end-of-life decisions, like withholding or 
withdrawing life-sustaining treatments, instead of contemplating 
participation in medical research.253 As UCLA identified almost two 
decades ago, a lack of clear guidance for researchers and research 
institutions concerning proxy consent remains a challenge. Given the 
trend of subjects traveling to institutions in different jurisdictions to 
participate in the limited number of AD clinical trials available, the 
inconsistency in state laws may pose a threat not only to trial enrollment, 
but also to advancements in science.254 
2. Research Advance Directives 
Several proposed guidelines, including at the state level, suggest 
requiring competent individuals to document their preferences in a 
formal advanced directive.255 Utah has the only living will statute that 
explicitly mentions research.256 Utah allows advance health care 
directive documents to “authorize an agent to consent to the adult’s 
participation in medical research.”257 
In the 2000 NIH study, researchers assessed how the proposed 
requirement might affect research by counting how many adults 
completed research advance directives.258 Of 2,371 adults surveyed, 11% 
                                                     
252. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322 (2019). 
253. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19a-570–571 (West 2019); IOWA CODE ANN. 
§ 144A.7 (West 2019); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-106 (West 2019); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2133.08 (West 2017); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 9731 (West 2019) (limited to making decisions 
about DNR orders or Clinician Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment). 
254. Compare Search of: Recruiting Studies | Alzheimer’s Disease, CLINICALTRIALS.GOV (Mar. 9, 
2018), https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/results/map?recrs=a&cond=Alzheimer+Disease&map= 
[https://perma.cc/J359-UKW8] (223 AD trials currently recruiting in the United States; 395 AD trials 
currently recruiting globally), with Search of: Recruiting Studies | Breast Cancer, 
CLINICALTRIALS.GOV, https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/results/map?recrs=a&cond=Breast+Cancer&map= 
[https://perma.cc/QJ6L-P8LL] (936 breast cancer trials currently recruiting in the United States; 1,784 
breast cancer trials globally). 
255. See Dresser, supra note 194; Valerie Gutmann Koch, A Policy in Flux: New York State’s 
Evolving Approach to Human Subjects Research Involving Individuals Who Lack Consent Capacity, 
42 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 383, 384 (2014) (New York State Advisory Work Group formed in response 
to the T.D. litigation); Franklin G. Miller, Comments on the Second Report of the Maryland 
Attorney General’s Research Working Group, 1 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 193 (1998).  
256. UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2a-107(1)(a)(v) (West 2019). 
257. Id. 
258. Muthappan et al., supra note 204. 
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had completed a research advanced directive.259 The study concluded 
that research-specific advance directives might block important 
research.260 The study did not, however, focus on individuals with AD, 
which is degenerative, fatal, and currently has no prevention, treatment, 
or cure.261 
III. THE STATE OF ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE RESEARCH 
AD presents a global public health crisis; it cannot be prevented, 
treated, or cured. This Part examines the current state of AD in the 
United States and the history of AD research failures. It also explores 
attitudes towards AD research, which are mostly favorable. Finally, it 
offers an overview of how researchers assess consent capacity for the 
few AD clinical trials currently available. 
A. Alzheimer’s Disease Is an Emerging Public Health Crisis 
An estimated 5.5 million individuals in the United States are currently 
living with AD.262 By 2050, this number could rise as high as 
16 million.263 AD is the sixth leading cause of death in the United 
States.264 It kills more than breast cancer and prostate cancer 
combined.265 Technically, physicians cannot definitively diagnose AD 
until an autopsy is conducted after death.266 Physicians, however, have 
devised neurological assessments to determine whether patients likely 
have progressive AD.267 This process typically begins with a diagnosis 
                                                     
259. Id. 
260. Id. 
261. Alzheimer’s Ass’n, supra note 3, at 326, 329. 
262. Id. at 334 (“Alzheimer’s dementia is underdiagnosed and underreported.”). 
263. Id. at 338. 
264. Id. 
265. Id. 
266. How Is Alzheimer’s Disease Diagnosed?, NAT’L INST. ON AGING, 
https://www.nia.nih.gov/health/how-alzheimers-disease-diagnosed [https://perma.cc/N6JR-SGZH]  
(“It’s important to note that Alzheimer’s disease can be definitively diagnosed only after death, by 
linking clinical measures with an examination of brain tissue in an autopsy. Occasionally, 
biomarkers—measures of what is happening inside the living body—are used to diagnose 
Alzheimer’s.”). 
267. See Jacqueline K. Kueper et al., The Alzheimer’s Disease Assessment Scale-Cognitive 
Subscale (ADAS-Cog): Modifications and Responsiveness in Pre-Dementia Populations. A 
Narrative Review, 63 J. ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE 423 (2018). 
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of “mild cognitive impairment” (MCI).268 MCI generally refers to 
dementia, delirium, or another cognitive syndrome.269 Because AD 
symptoms are not always readily recognizable, especially for 
unsuspecting patients (e.g., “early onset” patients under age sixty-five), 
patients may be misdiagnosed or undiagnosed until mid-stage symptoms 
appear.270 
Beyond the physical cost, AD causes tremendous emotional strain and 
financial expense.271 In 2017, Alzheimer’s and other dementias cost the 
nation $259 billion.272 More than 16 million people provide unpaid care 
for individuals with AD or other dementias.273 These caregivers provide 
an estimated 18.2 billion hours of care valued at more than 
$230 billion.274 
Recognizing the catastrophic costs, Congress passed NAPA in 2011 
to coordinate all federal AD initiatives.275 The statute also created the 
National Alzheimer’s Project under HHS.276 Subsequently, Congress 
increased funding for AD research through the NIH.277 Despite 
exponential funding surges, the U.S. government funds only one third of 
the AD clinical trials currently recruiting in the United States.278 
                                                     
268. See What Is Mild Cognitive Impairment?, NAT’L INST. ON AGING, 
https://www.nia.nih.gov/health/what-mild-cognitive-impairment [https://perma.cc/GM7J-JWNF]. 
269. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 
(DSM-IV) 123–24 (4th ed. 1994). 
270. See Alzheimer’s Ass’n, supra note 3, at 334, 370 n.A4, 371. 
271. See Freeman, supra note 6. 
272. Alzheimer’s Ass’n, supra note 3 (Medicare: $131 billion; Medicaid: $44 billion; out of 
pocket: $56 billion; other: $28 billion). 
273. Id. 
274. Id. 
275. National Alzheimer’s Project Act, Pub. L. No. 111-375, 124 Stat. 4100 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 11225 (2018)). The statute designates the Secretary of Health and Human Services as the 
implementer of an integrated national plan and coordinator of Alzheimer’s research and services 
across all federal agencies. 42 U.S.C. § 11225; see also id. § 11201 (providing statistics illustrating 
Congress’s findings). 
276. 42 U.S.C. § 11225(b). 
277. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-31, 131 Stat. 525 ($2,048,610,000 
for the National Institute on Aging); see also OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE 
U.S. GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR 2017, at 11 (2016) (“A seven percent increase in National 
Institutes of Health . . . will go toward critical research priorities like Alzheimer’s disease.”). 
278. Search of: Recruiting Studies | Alzheimer’s Disease | NIH, U.S. Fed, CLINICALTRIALS.GOV (May 
13, 2019), https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/results/map?recrs=a&cond=Alzheimer+Disease&fund=01&map= 
[https://perma.cc/5X7X-GBM3] (discussing how the NIH and other U.S. federal agencies fund seventy-
three AD trials currently recruiting); see also Search of: Recruiting Studies | Alzheimer’s Disease, supra 
note 254 (223 AD trials currently recruiting in the United States). 
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B. Alzheimer’s Research: A History of Failure 
Despite the time, effort, and increasing resources, researchers have 
not achieved a serious breakthrough in AD research.279 In the past 
several decades,280 AD research has seen a remarkable 99.6% failure 
rate.281 From 2002 to 2012, researchers conducted clinical trials with 244 
drugs for AD.282 Only one of the 244 drugs successfully completed 
clinical trials and went on to receive FDA approval.283 
While the leading theory of the disease identifies beta-amyloid 
protein as a key component of the disease,284 researchers have failed to 
effectively target amyloid or other AD-specific traits.285 In other words, 
without fully understanding how AD works, researchers struggle to 
identify a drug agent that affects the progression of the disease.286 
Furthermore, experts have identified several other factors to account for 
these failures, including the “high cost of drug development” and the 
blood-brain barrier, “which only very specialized small-molecule drugs 
can cross.”287 
NIH Director Dr. Francis Collins, testifying before the U.S. Senate 
Appropriations Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services in 
February 2014, stated that “[w]e are not at the moment limited by ideas. 
We’re not limited by scientific opportunities. We’re not limited by 
talent. We are, unfortunately, limited by resources to be able to move 
this enterprise forward at the pace that it could take.”288 
                                                     
279. Freeman, supra note 6. 
280. Carroll, supra note 13; Freeman, supra note 6; Healy, supra note 13 (“Idalopirdine, an 
experimental drug that seemed one of the most promising candidates to treat Alzheimer’s disease, 
failed several phase 3 clinical trials.”). 
281. Burke, supra note 13. 
282. Alzheimer’s Ass’n, supra note 3, at 332 (based on trials registered with a NIH registry of 
publicly and privately funded clinical studies). 
283. Id. 
284. Id. at 328–29.  
285. See Adam Feuerstein, Biogen Halts Studies of Closely Watched Alzheimer’s Drug, A Blow to 
Hopes for New Treatment, SCIENTIFIC AM.: STAT (Mar. 22, 2019), 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/biogen-halts-studies-of-closely-watched-alzheimers-
drug-a-blow-to-hopes-for-new-treatment/ [https://perma.cc/3Z39-JQN6]. 
286. Alzheimer’s Ass’n, supra note 3, at 328 (“[M]uch is yet to be discovered about the precise 
biological changes that cause the disease, why it progresses more quickly in some than in others, 
and how the disease can be prevented, slowed or stopped.”). 
287. Id. at 332. 
288. Taking a Toll on Families and the Economy: The Rising Cost of Alzheimer’s in America: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Dep’ts. of Labor, Health & Human Servs., & Educ., & Related 
Agencies of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 113th Cong. 19 (2014) [hereinafter Taking a Toll] 
(statement of Francis Collins, Director, National Institutes of Health).  
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Congress responded to Dr. Collins’s plea with annual appropriations 
increases directed to AD research.289 However, researchers and funders 
continue to focus on studying the basic science behind AD.290 Therefore, 
as opposed to investing in so-called “ideas” and “talent” towards a cure, 
research is focusing precious dollars on the basic questions that may not 
impact for patients for at least another generation.291 
Despite a few promising studies,292 the current research strategy 
focuses on prevention and treating symptoms.293 The medical 
community still does not fully know what causes cancer, but thanks to 
aggressive and deliberate clinical trials, we have treatments and even 
cures for most cancers.294 Unsurprisingly, there are approximately 1,800 
currently recruiting cancer clinical trials compared to fewer than 400 AD 
clinical trials.295 Only seventeen of AD trials in the final stage of drug 
development tested disease-modifying therapies in 2018.296 In other 
                                                     
289. See Richard Hodes, We Have a Budget for FY 2019!, NAT’L INST. ON AGING (Oct. 24, 
2018), https://www.nia.nih.gov/research/blog/2018/10/we-have-budget-fy-2019 
[https://perma.cc/ZQ47-VYY9] (“The biggest increases in funding directed at Alzheimer’s and 
related dementias came from Congress in the last four fiscal years: additional appropriations in FY 
2016 reached $350 million; in FY 2017, $400 million; in FY 2018, $414 million; and this year’s 
additional funding of $425 million. Overall, between FY 2014 and 2019, NIA funding increases for 
Alzheimer’s disease and related dementias research totaled $1.7 billion.”). 
290. See Robert Preidt, The Focus Shifts in Alzheimer’s Research, HEALTHDAY NEWS (Apr. 10, 
2018), https://consumer.healthday.com/cognitive-health-information-26/alzheimer-s-news-20/the-
focus-shifts-in-alzheimer-s-research-732767.html [https://perma.cc/HR7K-VBBH]. 
291. See Taking a Toll, supra note 288. 
292. See, e.g., Jeff D. Williamson et al., Effect of Intensive vs Standard Blood Pressure Control 
on Probable Dementia: A Randomized Clinical Trial, 321 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 553, 559 (2019) 
(stating “[t]his is the first trial, to our knowledge, to demonstrate an intervention that significantly 
reduces the occurrence of MCI . . . [h]owever, some caution should be exercised in interpreting this 
result, both because MCI was not the primary cognitive outcome of the trial and because it is not 
clear what this effect may mean for the longer-term incidence of dementia.” Notably, this study 
concluded that treating adults with more aggressive blood pressure control “did not result in a 
significant reduction in the risk of probable dementia”).  
293. See, e.g., U.S. Study to Protect Brain Health Through Lifestyle Intervention to Reduce Risk 
(POINTER), CLINICALTRIALS.GOV, https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/NCT03688126 
[https://perma.cc/5VNC-LMG6] (“The purpose of this research study is to see if lifestyle changes 
can protect memory and thinking (cognition) as we age. A recent study in Finland found that a 
combination of physical and cognitive exercise, diet, and social activity protected cognitive function 
in healthy older adults who were at increased risk of significant memory loss. So far no medications 
can rival this positive outcome. The point of POINTER is to test if lifestyle change can also protect 
against memory loss in Americans.”). 
294. See Ron Louie, Alzheimer’s Clinical Research Lacks Leadership, BALT. SUN (Apr. 26, 2017, 
2:16 PM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/bs-ed-alzheimer-progress-20170426-
story.html [https://perma.cc/Q22H-F93B]. 
295. See supra note 254. 
296. See Jeffrey Cummings et al., Alzheimer’s Disease Drug Development Pipeline: 2018, 4 
ALZHEIMER’S & DEMENTIA 195–96 (2018) (“Phase III of the 2018 AD pipeline has 26 agents; 17 
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words, if informed consent remains a barrier to more aggressive clinical 
trials, AD research may continue to stall as a result. 
1. Attitudes Toward Proxy Consent for Alzheimer’s Research 
As mentioned in Part II, researchers conducted several studies 
regarding older adults and AD patients’ attitudes towards research and 
future incapacity.297 A 2002 NIH study assessed attitudes of healthy 
individuals who had a family history of AD or prior research 
participation.298 The study found that “[t]he vast majority of respondents 
were willing to participate in clinical research” if their ability to consent 
became impaired.299 A 2009 national study explored older adults’ 
attitudes toward enrollment of incompetent subjects in AD research.300 A 
vast majority of adults surveyed over sixty-five years of age indicated 
that they would be willing to give advanced consent to “blood draw 
studies” and almost half said they would be willing to participate in 
studies that included lumbar punctures, which may cause pain.301 These 
findings suggest that not offering higher risk studies for AD patients 
would in fact “disrespect these patients.”302 
Another study found that while there is general support for proxy 
consent in AD research, surrogates may prefer the best interest 
standard.303 Surrogate decision makers surveyed may want to maximize 
what they think is best, as opposed to pursuing what they believe the 
patients would want.304 In other words, many study partners may be 
compelled to impose the best interest standard instead of substituted 
judgment. Regardless of the standard, the study found that AD patients 
                                                     
[disease-modifying therapies], one cognitive-enhancing agent, and eight drugs for behavioral 
symptoms. Among the [disease-modifying therapies], 14 addressed amyloid targets, one involved a 
tau-related target, one involved neuroprotection, and one had a metabolic [mechanism of action].”). 
297. See supra Section II.A.2.a. 
298. Dave Wendler et al., Views of Potential Subjects Toward Proposed Regulations for Clinical 
Research with Adults Unable to Consent, 159 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 585 (2002). 
299. Id. at 589. 
300. Jason Karlawish et al., Older Adults’ Attitudes Toward Enrollment of Non-Competent 
Subjects Participating in Alzheimer’s Research, 166 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 182 (2009). 
301. Id.  
302. Howe, supra note 193, at 48 (emphasis added). 
303. Jason Karlawish et al., The Views of Alzheimer Disease Patients and Their Study Partners 
on Proxy Consent for Clinical Trial Enrollment, 16 AM. J. GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY 240, 245 (2008) 
(“[M]ost proxies favored the bests interest over the substituted judgment standard to guide making 
decisions about study participants.”). 
304. Id. 
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and their study partners supported proxy consent for themselves and as a 
matter of policy.305 
C. Assessing Capacity to Consent in Alzheimer’s Research 
As a disease that slowly cripples mental capacity over an extended 
period, AD presents a unique challenge in clinical trials. One of the most 
pervasive legal doctrines present in medical and research settings is 
informed consent.306 This challenging legal and regulatory mandate 
becomes more complicated with patients who lack the capacity to 
consent.307 While there may be a distinction between “capacity” and 
“competency,” the terms are used interchangeably for medical and legal 
purposes.308 
The first threshold question is whether an individual has the capacity 
to consent. Does an AD diagnosis immediately equate to lack of 
capacity? If the patient is in an early AD stage at diagnosis, they may be 
deemed “competent” to sign an advance directive, a DPOA for health 
care, and perhaps, a research consent form.309 As the disease progresses, 
the window of opportunity closes, and the question becomes much more 
difficult. If the patient has not implemented an advance directive or 
DPOA and a clinical trial becomes available for later stage AD patients, 
how can they enroll? Clinically, “patients with Alzheimer’s disease and 
other dementias have high rates of incompetence with regard to such 
decisions; more than half of patients with mild-to-moderate dementia 
may have impairment, and incompetence is universal among patients 
with more severe dementia.”310 
Clinicians have contemplated how to assess and determine capacity to 
consent,311 specifically for patients with dementia or AD. Study results 
raised the concern that many patients with mild AD may not be 
competent to consent to treatment and supported the value of 
                                                     
305. Id. 
306. See supra Section I.A. 
307. See supra Section I.A. 
308. See, e.g., Dippel, supra note 50; cf. Hoffman et al., supra note 61; Saks et al., supra note 172. 
309. See supra Section I.B.2. 
310. Paul S. Appelbaum, Assessment of Patients’ Competence to Consent to Treatment, 357 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1834, 1835 (2007) (citing Scott Y. H. Kim, Jason H. Karlawish & Eric D. Caine, 
Current State of Research on Decision-Making Competence of Cognitively Impaired Elderly 
Persons, 10 AM. J. GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY 151 (2002)). 
311. Evan G. DeRenzo, Robert R. Conley & Raymond Love, Assessment of Capacity to Give 
Consent to Research Participation: State-of-the-Art and Beyond, 1 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 66 
(1998). 
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standardized clinical vignettes for assessment of competency in 
dementia.312 For example, the “Alzheimer’s Disease Assessment Scale-
Cognitive” subscale “is the de facto standard primary outcome 
neuropsychological measure for AD trials.”313 It measures several 
cognitive domains, including memory, language, and praxis.314 There 
remains, however, no standardized assessment tool nor ethical or 
regulatory framework to determine an AD patient’s ability to consent. 
IV. UNIFORM PROXY CONSENT STANDARDS ARE NEEDED 
FOR RESEARCH SUBJECTS WITH ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE 
While the updated Common Rule superficially solves the problem of 
proxy consent in research, it ultimately leaves confusion among differing 
state statutes and IRB practices.315 Indeed, most states have enacted laws 
to address surrogate decision-making in clinical contexts.316 According 
to the updated Common Rule, these laws can simply be extended to the 
research context.317 However, this quick fix could have negative 
consequences on AD research, especially in states that restrict surrogate 
decision-making and follow the “best interest” standard. Therefore, this 
Part argues that despite the Common Rule update, states should enact 
laws for proxy consent in research that explicitly apply the substituted 
judgment standard. Furthermore, IRBs and researchers should consider 
modifications to the informed consent process, including respecting 
assent and dissent for subjects with AD to enhance research 
participation. 
A. States Should Adopt Laws to Explicitly Address Surrogate 
Decision-Making in Research 
Fewer than a dozen states have contemplated proxy consent to make 
decisions about enrollment in medical research.318 State silence on this 
                                                     
312. Daniel C. Marson et al., Assessing the Competency of Patients with Alzheimer’s Disease 
Under Different Legal Standards, 52 ARCHIVES NEUROLOGY 949, 949 (1995). 
313. Kenneth Rockwood et al., The Clinical Meaningfulness of ADAS-Cog Changes in 
Alzheimer’s Disease Patients Treated with Donepezil in an Open-Label Trial, 7 BMC NEUROLOGY 
26, 26 (2007) (emphasis in original). 
314. Id. 
315. ABA COMM’N ON LAW & AGING, supra note 21; Ng Gong et al., supra note 28.  
316. ABA COMM’N ON LAW & AGING, supra note 21. 
317. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, supra note 25, at 7,260. 
318. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 223. For a 
discussion of the various state statutes, see Saks et al., supra note 172 and Section II.C.1, supra. 
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issue forced the federal government, as well as private institutions and 
IRBs, to fill the gaps. The result has been ill-defined policies regulating 
research involving participants who lack capacity.319 
Government agencies and commentators widely recognize the lack of 
clear guidance on surrogate decision-making in research.320 For 
example, Bioethics.gov states: “Although OHRP guidance indicates that 
state laws about appointing LARs for medical care might be relevant, 
uncertainty remains regarding whether laws specific to medical decision 
can or should extend to research decisions.”321 Even though the 2017 
Common Rule update does extend LARs for medical decisions to 
research,322 the question remains whether they should. Considering the 
wide variety in state law standards and IRB practices,323 the need for 
uniformity and certainty remains. 
To resolve this uncertainty, states should amend their current health 
care surrogate decision-maker laws to include a provision explicitly 
addressing participation in research. Amendments of this kind would 
clarify LARs decision-making parameters in the research context. 
Alternatively, states could follow California, Oklahoma, Kansas, and 
New Jersey by enacting specialized statutes to grant proxy consent in 
medical research.324 Additionally, these statutes might influence lawyers 
to advise their clients to contemplate the possibility of participating in 
research and include their preferences in advance directives. Default 
DPOA for Health Care and living will forms may follow to include 
provisions for individuals to consider proxy consent in research. 
1. The Substituted Judgment Standard Is More Appropriate than the 
Best Interest Standard in Alzheimer’s Research 
If states adopt LAR decision making in research laws, they should 
follow the substituted judgment standard. Currently, states vary widely 
on which standard surrogate decision-makers should follow—substituted 
judgment, best interest, or both.325 The 2017 Common Rule update 
overlooked this potential problem, as the regulatory change extends 
                                                     
319. Scott Y. H. Kim, The Ethics of Informed Consent in Alzheimer Disease Research, 7 NAT’L 
REV. NEUROLOGY 410 (2011). 
320. See PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 223, at 7. 
321. Id. 
322. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, supra note 25, at 7,260. 
323. ABA COMM’N ON LAW & AGING, supra note 21; Ng Gong et al., supra note 28. 
324. See supra notes 243, 249 and accompanying text. 
325. See Frolik & Whitton, supra note 68; Saks et al., supra note 172. 
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these various surrogate decision-making standards to the research 
context.326 Despite the difficulties of obtaining informed consent from 
subjects with AD, there is increasing evidence that such individuals and 
their surrogates can make decisions about research participation that are 
consistent with the subject’s values.327 Because substituted judgment—
or at least a hybrid model328—is ideal for AD research,329 any 
amendments or statutes for surrogate decision-making in research must 
articulate this standard clearly, while distinguishing standards for 
medical treatment. 
If researchers and surrogates adopt a “best interest” standard for 
decision making in AD clinical trials, LARs might dictate AD subject 
enrollment or non-enrollment.330 For example, LARs might make 
decisions based on what they think is best for their loved ones, or worse, 
on LARs’ own personal desires and preferences.331 This approach, 
therefore, could result in a chilling effect on Alzheimer’s research 
enrollment—particularly in studies for later stage subjects that go 
beyond “minimal risk.” 
A substituted judgment approach would instead focus on the subject’s 
preferences.332 Whether the subject stated their wishes officially in an 
advanced directive or expressed their attitudes towards research 
throughout their life, LARs and researchers should abide by the subject’s 
wishes. Upon diagnosis of AD, patients likely maintain decision-making 
capacity to sign an advanced directive and express their desire to enroll 
in a clinical trial should the opportunity arise after they lose capacity. 
Therefore, physicians, social workers, and other care team members 
should recommend that newly diagnosed AD patients consider research 
participation in an advanced directive. Researchers must honor advance 
directives when they are in place and encourage subjects to develop 
directives in the event that participants might lose capacity during the 
course of a study.333 If the subject does not have an advanced directive in 
place, a clear state statute outlining LAR decision-making in research 
would enable subjects to enroll. 
                                                     
326. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, supra note 25, at 7,170–71. 
327. Kim, supra note 319. 
328. Frolik & Whitton, supra note 68. 
329. NAT’L INST. HEALTH, supra note 142. 
330. Karlawish et al., supra note 303, at 246. 
331. Id. at 240. 
332. See supra Sections I.B.1.a (discussing substituted judgment standard), III.B.1 (reviewing 
positive attitudes towards participation in AD research). 
333. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 223, at 2. 
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B. Modifying the Informed Consent Process Might Enhance 
Alzheimer’s Research Participation 
Informed consent can be an overwhelming and complicated process. 
Physicians and researchers must inform prospective medical research 
participants of the risks and benefits of research,334 which might consist 
of a long document with complex medical terminology. The assumption 
that even fully competent subjects understand this complex information 
is highly suspect. Therefore, various entities have made 
recommendations to simplify the process with the goal of enhancing 
understanding. “An individual’s understanding of the information 
needed to make a decision depends in part on how the information is 
presented and explained.”335 
With AD patients and their surrogates, consent information must 
explain the difference between therapeutic and non-therapeutic research. 
Researchers must also ensure that subjects understand the expected 
levels of burden and risk. IRBs, on the other hand, should not 
automatically disapprove proposals that might pose greater than minimal 
risk.336 Certain AD patients may be willing to participate in these 
studies, which may be necessary for progress towards NAPA’s goal to 
treat and prevent AD by 2025.337 
1. Respecting Assent and Dissent in Alzheimer’s Research 
The ethical underpinnings of informed consent are the right to 
autonomy and individual rights. To achieve these fundamental goals, 
AD clinical trials should adopt an assent standard for individuals with 
some capacity. While advance directives expressing research wishes 
would certainly provide clear and convincing evidence that a subject 
agrees to participate in studies broadly, they may not express a wish to 
participate in a particular study. Therefore, IRBs and principal 
investigators should consider assent and dissent as a supplemental 
model. “Many participants lacking consent capacity can still express 
meaningful desires regarding research procedures.”338 Seeking assent 
and respecting dissent maintains the dignity of all persons participating 
                                                     
334. Id. 
335. Id. at 6. 
336. See Ng Gong et al., supra note 28. 
337. National Alzheimer’s Project Act, Pub. L. No. 111-375, 124 Stat. 4100 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 11225 (2018)). 
338. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 223, at 6. 
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in research.339 Furthermore, “[m]eaningful expressions of assent and 
dissent are salient, even if insufficient, evidence of participants’ 
perspectives regarding decisions made on their behalf.”340 LARs will, of 
course, maintain control over signing informed consent forms, but this 
must not preclude investigators from respecting subjects’ assent and 
dissent to participation. 
As discussed in Part II, researchers conducting clinical trials 
involving another population with diminished capacity—children—have 
widely adopted assent. While children do not have the legal authority to 
consent, regulations recognize the subject’s autonomy and their right to 
be included in the decision-making process.341 It follows that adult 
subjects with diminished capacity must have a role in the informed 
consent process. Principal investigators must respect incapacitated 
subjects’ assent and dissent to participate in clinical trials.342 
An outstanding challenge with this approach is the unpredictability of 
Alzheimer’s disease and its progression. The challenge beyond subjects 
providing adequate informed and voluntary consent to participate in a 
study is the subsequent likelihood that they will lose their capacity for 
independent choice.343 “As a result, they become unable to exercise their 
right to withdraw from a study. Study designs must, therefore, provide 
for this contingency.”344 
CONCLUSION 
The National Alzheimer’s Project Act’s ambitious goal to “prevent 
and effectively treat” AD by 2025 has a rapidly approaching deadline.345 
In order to come remotely close to achieving NAPA’s goals, researchers 
must develop clinical trials, perhaps with greater than minimal risk, for 
individuals with later stage AD. Establishing a uniform standard for 
surrogate decision making and proxy consent in research will promote 
AD patients’ autonomy to participate in critical clinical trials. Because 
the federal government failed to establish such an approach in the 2017 
                                                     
339. Id. 
340. Id. 
341. 45 C.F.R. § 46.402(b) (2018). 
342. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 223.  
343. NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, RESEARCH INVOLVING PERSONS WITH MENTAL 
DISORDERS THAT MAY AFFECT DECISIONMAKING CAPACITY ch. 2 (1998), 
https://bioethicsarchive.georgetown.edu/nbac/capacity/Informed.htm [https://perma.cc/S6E3-BU46]. 
344. Id. 
345. National Alzheimer’s Project Act, Pub. L. No. 111-375, 124 Stat. 4100 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 11225 (2018)). 
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Common Rule update—leaving the question of proxy consent in 
research to a variety of state laws and IRB practices—states must adopt 
clear research-specific proxy consent statutes. Applying the substituted 
judgment standard instead of the best interest standard for surrogate 
decision making in the research context will ensure a more accurate and 
respectful approach. Finally, respecting subjects’ autonomy, even after 
they are deemed incompetent, by adopting assent and dissent standards 
is consistent with regulations for minors and other vulnerable 
populations. With a uniform approach to proxy consent in research, AD 
patients, families, surrogates, and researchers will know what to expect 
in their collective goal to find a cure. 
